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Faith and Belief (Princeton, 1979) by Wilfred Cantwell Smith is a short book 
of less than two hundred pages, but documented in as many added ones of 
vastly erudite notes and references. After rereading it a few times in the past 
months, I feel certain that this admirable work may be counted on to influence 
the evaluation of religious phenomena in their fundamental relatcdness to our 
humanness for many years to come. For the book addresses itself specifically 
to the vital questions: “What has faith to do with believing? What has it to do 
with being human?’’ It may well revolutionize priorities in religious studies 
and, at least as importantly, contribute to that more open, more enlightenedly 
human and generously macro-ecumenical approach, that is so desperately needed 
to offset the all-pervading nihilism of modern society.
Cantwell Smith, whose The Meaning of Religion (1962) was somewhat of an 
event, draws our attention to the fact that when wc speak of Christianity, Bud­
dhism, and Islam as “religions,” we are using a comparatively recent and more­
over inadequate, even misleading reification, a mere abstraction, for what in 
reality, are ever-developing and waning communities of faith, and traditions 
which have been shaped by countless generations of men and women living lives 
of faith.
The phenomenology of religion, while gathering and studying religious data, 
has hardly considered these persons, whose involvement and commitment 
elevated systems of symbols to the religious level. Faith, the author holds, is a 
constituent of man qua man. The relationship between faith and belief is what 
this book succeeds in clarifying magnificently, in a style which at first may 
strike one as somewhat pedantic .. . until it discloses itself as being merely 
extraordinarily and punctiliously precise, and as responsible as its discourse in 
terms of historical data demands.
Faith is, for the author, the fundamental religious category, that human 
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propensity which throughout history and across the globe, has given rise to a 
prodigious variety of religious forms, yet has remained elusive, personal, both 
prior to and beyond the forms it has assumed.
Although we may by now have gathered considerable information about, 
and descriptions of, the various religious systems, we have not yet risen to the 
challenge of understanding the impulse behind them. We have simply recon­
structed the overt data of religious life, have observed the observable. But to 
live religiously is not to live in the presence of certain symbols, but to be involved 
in these symbols with that total and existential response which affects not 
only one's relation to religious systems, but one’s relation to oneself, to one’s 
neighbor and to the cosmic Whole. Faith is that constituent of the human 
person which discerns meaning: in his own existence as well as in the order of 
the universe. Faith then is to “see the point” of being here at all. It is this 
involvement and commitment called faith, that bestows on religious phenomena 
their religious significance, for faith is that which relates us to the Transcendent.
It is this human constituent that has been expressed in, elicited, nurtured and 
shaped by, the religious traditions of the world. It cannot be defined, but to stake 
out the direction in which its locus may be found is the purpose of Cantwell 
Smith’s study. To speak of faith as the fundamental religious category may 
make Christian and Islamic theologians demur. They may insist on positing 
God as the fundamental religious category. Even then they must admit that it 
is not God but the idea of God, that may be regarded as such; and if they should 
aver that God has entered human history and is active in it most significantly, 
it may be pointed out that He is active in it through and by the life of faith of 
concrete human persons.
However this may be, beliefs must certainly not be posited as the primary 
religious category. For beliefs are time- and culture-specific expressions, 
formulations of faith constantly changing in the worldwide range of history, 
whereas religious faith has remained, in all its variations, a constant. For it is 
not argued here that faith is everywhere “the same.” On the contrary: for a 
Hindu, it is pointed out, more than one type of faith may be valid and this not 
only for different persons or groups in society, but even at different stages of a 
single person’s lifetime. Often there are greater variations in faith to be found 
within one of the great traditions than between the traditions as such. Never­
theless, faith always reveals itself to be that quality of human living, that encom­
passes a view of, and an attitude to, Reality as having a transcendental dimension 
beyond the everyday empirical. The opposite of faith is not unbelief or disbelief, 
but unfaith or “that bleak inability to find either the world around one, or even 
one’s own life meaningful, an absence of mutuality, in that one cannot respond 
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either to the universe or to one’s neighbor knowing that one will be responded 
to; an almost total dependence on immediate events, coupled with the sense 
that immediate events cannot really or for long be depended on, a sense of 
lost-ness. .Other current terms that cover this condition in its various 
aspects are: nihilism, alienation, loss of identity, uncommittedness, meaningless­
ness, existential vacuum....
The confusion between faith and belief is to a great extent due to the change in 
meaning the word “belief” has undergone since the Renaissance and which the 
author traces in great detail. In short: “to believe” once meant “to hold dear.” 
It is etymologically connected with lief, love, to be love, to regard as lovable, to 
cherish. Hence in reading a medieval religious text one is likely to misinterpret 
it, if one is not aware of this change in usage, and read in it what was never 
intended. A medieval manuscript, for instance, may urge Christians “not to set 
their belief” on worldly goods. “To set belief” means here: to set “one’s heart” 
on worldly goods. “To believe in God” was not an option to either believe (in 
the modem sense) or not, in God’s existence, for God was part of the furniture 
of the medieval mind, part of its pre-suppositional framework. “To believe in 
God” once meant indeed: “to set one’s heart on God.” It was the total com­
mitment to God. In the modem context, however, the “existence” of God has 
become an uncertainty. To believe—in the modern sense of the word—in God 
is an option: one does or one does not. The meaning of the word “believe” 
shifted from the existential to the descriptive. It is characteristic that in the 
earlier period the verb occurs predominantly in the first person, as “I believe,” 
expressing self-involvement. Later it more often refers to others as in: “What 
do Buddhists believe?” or “Some people still believe that the earth is flat.” 
To believe has become “not to know,” it implies at the very least a lack of 
certitude, an open neutrality as to the correctness or otherwise of what is 
believed, a concept by which one conveys that a view is held ideationally 
without a final decision having been reached as to its validity. In this sense 
“believing” has become the standard characterization for religious positions in 
the modem world. To say “I believe” no longer indicates a commitment, nor 
does it include the expectation that others will concur in one’s doctrines, 
opinions or sentiments.
♦
No interpretation of faith is likely to be persuasive which is insensitive to 
the mundane elements as well as to the aberrations and pathology of religious 
involvement. Yet, neither can it ignore the capacity of faith to cause persons and 
groups to transcend the mundane, to become most authentically human, and 
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this—normally—in the context of human communities. The history of religion 
is not that of symbol-systems and belief-systems, but the as yet unwritten 
history of the depth or shallowness, richness or poverty, authenticity or in­
sincerity, splendid wisdom or murderous folly, with which persons and societies 
have responded to the symbols around them.
In the Christian sphere the role of “belief” (in the modern sense) has been a 
major one. Assent to propositional doctrines often became the qualification for 
membership in the group. In other communities doctrine is negligible in im­
portance compared with ritual, which for instance plays the main role in 
Shinto. A Shinto poem expresses it perfectly: “What it is that dwelleth here/I 
know not/yet my heart is full of awe/and the tears trickle down.”
We are here at the opposite pole of the Christian emphasis on intellectual 
and moralistic concepts. But not only religious communities show widely 
varying beliefs that come and go, for so do science and philosophy. Yet here too 
faith in their ultimate ineffability persists. . ..
*
In order to elucidate the universality of faith in relation to belief, the author 
examines Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Christian exemplifications. Perhaps 
the Buddhist one is not the most accomplished in this brilliant analytical 
sequence, although there is much in it that is highly quotable: “The recognition 
in relatively recent Western studies of its (Nirvana's) transcendent quality, and 
its ultimacy in the Buddhist scheme of things, has led to the recent suggestion 
that wc were hasty and perhaps simply wrong in calling the Buddha's position 
atheist or even world-denying. No modern logical positivist or linguistic 
analyst has outdone him in insisting that human language is incapable of 
dealing with metaphysical reality. . ..” Professor Smith also stresses that the 
Dharma is not merely some system of Gautama's making, but that the Buddha's 
“Ancient Path” is far more than twenty-five hundred years old, for it is the Path 
trodden by the Buddhas of bygone kalpas, and that the Dharma does not owe 
its validity or authority to the fact that the Buddha was a wise and great man. 
On the contrary, Gautama became wise and great because he awoke to the 
Dharma’s pre-existent Truth, recreated and revivified it.
That we live in the kind of universe where such Truth obtains, is the “good 
news” Gautama preached. To the Buddha what matters is neither one’s theology, 
nor the ritual observances one performs, nor the caste one belongs to, nor one’s 




In theoretical terms it is a metaphysics of morality: that the only final 
truth is goodness, that a human life well lived reflects, exemplifies transcen­
dent Reality. The point is not to transcend the world, but to live well 
within it. If you do live well within it, you will find that you have tran­
scended it. . . .
The Buddhist does not believe this to be true, but/S/kfr it to be true and Buddhism 
is religious because through it men and women’s lives were lived in what the 
Western world has traditionally called “the Presence of God.” And it could 
be argued that those Westerners who use the term “God”—whether to affirm 
or deny it—would do well to include this quality of reality in their meaning 
for that term. The time surely has come, when they must incorporate these 
Buddhist insights into what they do or do not “believe”....
•
In the Islamic example which follows, “belief in God” seems to be spectacularly 
central. But this is only so if we use the word belief in the modern, sceptical 
sense. For the Muslim does not “believe” (in the modern sense) in God. One can 
even say that the Qur’an is a belief system that does not believe in believing. 
For Islam, God is the pre-supposition, the Muslim cannot even conceive of the 
possibility that one might doubt the existence of God. In the Qur’an the concept 
“belief” as a religious activity docs not occur, and what has been mistranslated 
as belief, should read “to have faith in”: one’s positive recognition and accept­
ance of the divine summons and one’s commitment to its demands. God—not 
“believed in” but pre-supposed—has spoken His command and henceforth men 
are divided into those who obey and accept and those who reject or rebel 
against His command. The creed of the Muslim is therefore not an affirmation 
of “belief,” but the explicit bearing of witness, the public announcement of one’s 
affirmation of a personal and corporate commitment. In so far as “beliefs” 
(zartna) exist, they are rather opinions, usually wrong ones, or absurd and 
perverse notions. The outsider may think of the Qur’an in relation to Muham­
mad, the Muslim can only think of it as the word of God; it is not Muhammad’s 
scripture but His. In sharp contrast to the anthropocentrism of the modern 
Westerner, Islam’s view is radically theocentric and faith is the engagement 
with truth, in which mind and heart and act are integrated, in dynamic solidarity 
with the entire community. “Infidelity” (kufr) is the self-destructive refusal to 
participate in the truth, it is the lie in the soul (takdhib).
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Only when propositions which at one time were unconscious are raised to the 
level of consciousness can the option of accepting or rejecting them arise. 
Sceptics, soon followed by religious persons, may then become aware of no 
longer accepting some erstwhile presuppositions. Objective evaluation of the 
symbol system now becomes possible. But although the symbol is human, what 
it points to is transcendent, and therefore the essential question remains as 
before: the response to the symbol.
It is not a new faith that is needed to overcome our existential vacuum, I 
understand Professor Smith to say, but a new notion of faith, helpful in inter­
preting man in relation to that transcendent dimension of Reality of which 
Michael Polanyi wrote in 1967: “The purpose of this essay is to reintroduce a 
concept which has served for two millenia as a guide to the understanding of 
nature and has been repudiated by the modern interpretations of science. I 
am speaking of the concept of Reality....” A notion of faith, global enough 
to do justice to the multitude of diverse forms, in ritual, in doctrine, in art, in 
ethics through which faith has appeared among us, is now overdue, if we are to 
survive as humans.
*
In Hindu society the analytical reflection and the complexity is so overt and 
accepted that one may say that there is a tendency to presume the validity of 
any religious position, intellectual or non-intellectual, until shown otherwise. 
The question of “belief” in the modem sense has never interested Hindu 
thinkers as a religious category. To see the universe as it really is, is for the 
Hindu not a matter of belief but of jnana, that direct higher knowing or insight 
into the Structure of Reality, that transcendental knowing, recognizing or 
insight—often analytical and critical, but never sceptical—which is not a way 
to salvation, but that is in itself salvation.
The important concept of astikya does not refer to what a Hindu “believes,” 
nor to what he practices. For Hindu religious life, in contrast to that of Chris­
tians and Muslims, knows neither orthodoxy nor orthopraxis, it is legitimately 
diverse and pluralistic. What is here decisive is astikya as a positive attitude to 
tradition, whatever one may make of this tradition.. . . Faith then becomes 
astikya-buddhi, the affirmative attitude towards the awareness, the discernment 
of, the awakening to, the transcendent.
*
I would consider writing a review of this highly concentrated, seminal work of 
historical and comparativist learning an impertinence on the part of a layman, 
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if it were not at the same time a personal act of gratitude to call attention to it. 
For Smith’s clarification of the relationship between faith and belief confirms 
and transilluminates what—I was still a child—I learned experientially and 
empirically by being born in an agnostic family that lived on a tiny a-religious 
island of its own, as it were, in the ocean of Catholicism at the southernmost tip 
of Holland. It was a Catholicism that at the time was still monolithic, funda­
mentalist, ultra-traditionalist and politically as powerful as it was devious. 
Still, the very earth we lived on was drenched by almost two millennia of 
Catholic culture. The Romanesque cathedral of my hometown was built a 
thousand years ago on the remains of a Roman Jupiter temple, altar pieces by 
Jan and Hubert Van Eyck, the high mysticism of Ruysbroeck and Thomas A 
Kempis, the play of Everyman, the organ preludes of Cdsar Franck, these were 
among the fruits of a regional culture, as profoundly Catholic as it was arche- 
typally human. Solemn processions, colorful ritual, Gregorian chant, candle 
light, roadside shrines on crossroads, seemed to whisper coded messages, 
conveyed secret whisperings of some transcendent Reality, making the unseen 
almost seeable. Madonna and child, doleful crucifix on the cathedral wall, 
Christ in Glory on a tympanum gave first intimations—or were they reminders ? 
—of life and death as mystery. Having no other symbol system at hand, these 
earliest intuitions of the transcendent found their focus in the Catholic symbols 
that surrounded me. While my schoolmates were being indoctrinated with the 
concepts and dogmatic constructs they had to learn by rote as part of their 
conditioning as “good Catholics,” I, the outsider, could let these symbols1 of 
the Sacred, in which I found surpassing beauty, truth and rightness, play freely 
in my mind, allowing them to decode themselves without constraint, beyond 
the realm of logos. These symbols of a Catholic culture provided me with the 
indispensible scaffolding for a life in which the awareness of both the transcen­
dent dimension and the ontological interdependence of all existence was to 
become central. Later I would find, through Mahayana, the symbol system of 
my childhood transilluminated in all its grandeur, both intellectually and 
existentially....
1 “The symbol is that appearance of the real which also includes the subject to 
whom it appears. Appearance is always for somebody, some consciousness’* (R. 
Panikkar, Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics).
Is it mere self-deception to interpret my childhood fascination with Catholic 
symbols—I never devalued them, on the contrary!—as astikya-buddhi? Or was 
it closer to that other Hindu concept which although not quite translatable by 
“faith,” sraddha, is that “which one sets one’s heart on,” without specifying too 
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precisely what it is one puts one’s heart on? For sraddha comes close to the 
involvement, the commitment, which lies at the root of the religious life, one’s 
finding, or being found by, something to which one gives one’s heart. In astikya- 
buddhi, that saying “yes” to a tradition, and in sraddha, these two Hindu con­
cepts combined, I now seem to recognize what moved me in my childhood 
response to the Catholic symbolism around me, made it into an initiation into 
what for lack of a better, less contaminated word is spoken of as faith, while 
ignoring all dogmatic formulations and resisting all indoctrination with beliefs: 
I never became a Catholic. . . .
Without sraddha all sacrifices, donations, oblations, prayers remain vacuous, 
heartless. The opposite of sraddha, Professor Smith explains, is not disbelief 
but simply indifference, ego-diffusion, scattered concerns. “As a man’s faith is, 
so is he,” says the Bhagavat Gita.
The universe and man are so constituted that sraddha is the intrinsically ap­
propriate orientation to what is true, right and real. To be gripped by the 
poignancy of myth, symbol, concept, or work of art, to be stirred by these to 
existential commitment, however labeled, is not a matter of either gullibility or 
belief, it is to be moved “to put one’s heart into” what one has seen. What in the 
West we call “a leap of faith,” is a person’s leap from objective knowing to 
existential commitment, the taking up of the authentic religious life, which 
inevitably spills over into every form of involvement, every activity. Such 
singleminded commitment has become exceedingly rare and its absence is 
characteristic of the modern nihilism which pervades every aspect of our 
contemporary world.
*
In the Christian example which follows, faith seems comparable with both the 
Hindu and Islamic mode of commitment. In this section Prof. Smith describes— 
based on Cyril of Jerusalem’s lectures on the Sacraments—the rite of baptism in 
the early church, as a going down into the baptismal font, from which one 
emerged free, washed clean of the tyranny of worldly attachments, of the world 
of atomistic disorder. The baptisand had become a free man, had entered the 
world of light. He had formally renounced Satan and all his works. He had re­
jected “the system,” the establishment, to range himself on the side of Christ....
In the subsequent anointment he became in fact “a Christ,” and in the 
eucharist he “partook” of the Christ, participated in the divine nature. This 
turnabout at the base transformed both inner and outer life by a commitment 
in which the question of “belief” in either God or Satan was not even inquired 
into. For both God and Satan were religio-cultural presuppositions, they were 
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the given. Nor was it a magic performance: the rite only worked provided 
“one put one’s heart into it.”
The Credo is cited as another example in which “belief” was originally not at 
issue. The word “Credo” derives from cor, cordes (heart), plus do (to place, 
to put, set or give). It too was a declaration of commitment, and only gradually 
did the Credo assume more doctrinal overtones. The classical creeds of the Church 
included no propositional statements. Credo therefore was related to sraddha: 
one set one’s heart, one committed oneself in an act of faith. Space prohibits 
quoting Professor Smith’s references to the attitude of Thomas Aquinas to 
the relationship between faith and belief, but the copious and fascinating 
documentation supplied, shows that for St. Thomas faith was “the capacity of 
the intellect to recognize the genuineness of the transcendent” and he judged 
that it may happen that the person of faith holds beliefs which, as products of 
the human imagination, are false, but that the faith involved in them is true.
Only in the nineteenth and early twentieth century did Catholic teaching begin 
to assert that “belief is the content of faith” and that this belief (in the modem 
sense of the word) is infallibly provided by the Teaching Church. The result was 
rather devastating, for the “object of faith” which used to be a person, God or 
Christ to whom one committed oneself, “through whom one had faith” became 
now ... a doctrine, an idea, a theory. The mood of faith which traditionally 
involved one's relationship to absolutes, to realities of surpassing grandeur and 
surety, became a mood of belief, opening the doors to those uncertainties, those 
matters of questionable validity, which could not escape the modern mind for 
which belief had become a discredited notion, as “knowledge” is—after being 
so fashionable for many years—now beginning to be seen as an aberrant 
oversimplification, namely, as that particularly limited awareness of the natu­
ral world described by the natural sciences. Poetry and art, the moral life and 
everything of “value,” was during this disconsolate period thought of, virtually 
by definition, as being in a realm which had nothing to do with “knowledge.” 
Nineteenth century theology in its attempt to present belief as a basic religious 
category, more or less the equivalent—or even as having priority over—faith, 
may have contributed to the weakening of the Church’s credibility. Theology 
and doctrine, being more central to it than to any other community on earth, 
made the yes/no, true/false answer to questions of “belief” into a veritable 
passport to “faith.” Henceforth the Christian discussion was no longer likely to 
center on transcendental realities, on faith as man’s relation to the tran­
scendent, but on belief as man’s relation to the conceptualizations, the doctrines 
which had once been the vital expressions of faith but had now become of 
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questionable validity as expressions of faith. The forced marriage between faith 
and belief was to end in divorce, and religious belief became often, instead of a 
stimulant, an obstacle to faith as a religious attitude towards existence.
Mark Twain’s schoolboy put it wittily: “Faith is belief in what you know ain't 
so.” In truth, however, faith is as central as belief is marginal. . ..
Faith is not subordinate, nor is it equivalent, to belief or to anything else 
mundane. To it all religious forms are at best secondary, as faith itself is second­
ary to, derivative from, and answerable to transcendent reality and truth. In 
the past, thinkers have rarely addressed themselves to faith in its global context, 
but the rise of unfaith now makes it possible to assess how much the faith­
communities have in common, in contrast to the bleakness of modern nihilism, 
that loss, not of belief only but of faith. Nihilism is the “unfaith” of those for 
whom nothing is worthwhile, for whom life consists of a congeries of disparate 
items without coherence, for whom persons have become things and for whom 
not only God is dead, but all meaning, order and purpose. Faith may be 
differentiated in seeing the point of life and of the world in disparate modes. 
Nevertheless it stands in total opposition to un-faith in seeing life and the 
universe as indeed having a point—a cosmic point—and that man can be 
grasped by it, and his life transformed. Geographical isolation and the 
exclusivistic dogmatism of Christians and (non-Sufi) Moslems have been the 
chief obstacles to recognizing faith as such, until in recent times secularist 
scientism became its arch-enemy.
The classical humanist secular (in its positive sense) tradition, was a tradition 
of faith in which nobility, force, dignity, coherence and trust contrast sharply 
with the alienated, irreligious secularism of our day. The vital question is 
whether our society can be the exception to the rule that human beings have 
in every age and culture lived by faith, and yet survive. ... If there is truth in 
Buddhism, it is not a Buddhist truth, but a truth in the universe to which 
Buddhism has called attention. Christians do not have a Christian truth-monop­
oly to propagate, but a truth that is consistently human. The opposite of Truth is 
not falsity, but ignorance.
One is not a human being and also a Buddhist, a Christian or a Jew; one is 
a human being by one’s relation as Buddhist, Jew, Christian or whatever, to the 
Real, not excluding the transcendent dimension but emphatically including it. 
The secularist orthodoxy that human beings have only the non-transcendent in 
common, is fast developing into that infernal, if not terminal, Western tragedy: 
the radically dehumanized society.
To sum up: faith is not belief in a doctrine, not even belief in the truth as 
such, whatever it may be. It is assent to the truth in the dynamic and personal 
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sense of commitment to it, it is the religious attitude to existence itself, both 
individually and communally, in its this-sided transcendence. In drawing, 
however inadequately, attention to the main ideas set forth in Faith and Belief 
I am aware of having ignored, perhaps distorted aspects of its discourse in its 
unquestionable greatness. Cantwell Smith does not claim to have presented more 
than an incipient attempt, which he hopes theologians, scientists, and laymen of 
the various religious communities will complete, for it is “our common human 
involvement, increasingly shared and sharable and persistently crucial in the 
mystery of that manifest Reality, our involvement in which I have called faith.”
Postscript
As I was correcting the typescript of the above article, a book arrived in the 
mail which I started to read and could not put down, and which I recommend 
highly to be read in conjunction with Cantwell Smith’s Faith and Belief. It is 
Raimundo Panikkar’s Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics: Crosscultural Studies 
(New York, 1980), published by the Paulist Press.
Dr. Panikkar, Professor of Religious Studies at the Universities of California 
at Santa Barbara and Varanasi, is particularly well placed to play a key role in 
the task Cantwell Smith assigns to others, namely to penetrate into our common 
human involvement with the crucial, shared mystery of faith. For he is trained 
as a scientist (Ph.D. in Chemistry) and holds doctorates in Philosophy and 
Theology; but at least as important is, that through his mixed Hindu and Spanish 
parentage he stands literally on the boundary between East and West. In his 
thirty published books (“The Unknown Christ of Hinduism” was his doctoral 
dissertation at Lateran University, Rome, published in 1961) and his over 300 
major academic articles in Theology, Hermeneutics and the History of Religion, 
he has laid the groundwork for a Christian theology that does full justice to the 
contributions the genius of the other world religions have to make to its enrich­
ment.
A few years ago this Catholic priest, grounded in both Western and Eastern 
traditions, wrote after a long absence from Europe: “I left as a Christian, found 
myself as a Hindu and I returned a Buddhist, without having ceased to be a 
Christian.” It is a confession that may well express a trans-religious, multi­
religious experience many of us each in our own way have shared. In the introduc­
tion to this book which is as erudite and original in approach as it is readable— 
Panikkar’s style is stimulating, poetically alive and innovative—he recognizes 
the state of human emergency in which we are living, and which hardly allows us 
to entertain ourselves with bagatelles. But he concludes that precisely because 
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of our situation we are in desperate need of those insights into the deeper struc­
tures of reality which may enable us to go to the roots of the problems that beset 
us. He sees it as his own task to contribute to the “radical turn of the spirit 
indispensible for the survival of humanness.*'
The hours I have spent with this book, which it would be vain to attempt 
more than draw attention to, have been more than rewarding. It has been 
exhilarating to read in his meditations on the Buddha, statements like: . . if 
it exists, transcendence is so transcendent, that it surpasses both our thought 
and our own being, and thus also any attempt to name’*.. . “to name the 
Absolute would (for the Buddha) be the greatest blasphemy.”
Faith he defines in many ways, as “a human invariant,” as “existential open­
ness towards transcendence, or, if this seems to be loaded, more simply as 
existential openness, as a bottomless capacity to be filled without closing,” and 
as“.. . something that frees us from inauthentic existence,” and as “. . . unique, 
even if its conceptual translation and vital manifestations are multiple 
“not a relation to an only transcendent ‘God,’ but the solidarity with the whole 
of Reality,” as “that x in man which makes possible the ‘recognition’ of the 
foundation” about which “all terminology is just the concrete objectification 
of a cultural system.” He speaks of faith also as “the ontological link relating 
man to the transcendent, not essentially tied to any fixed doctrine, but which, 
by making it depend on unalterable formulations would be treason against 
history.” But above all, faith is for Panikkar “questioning, an ontological 
thirst that cannot be quenched, an anthropological desire that cannot be 
satisfied and that—if it could—would annihilate man by destroying his con­
stitutive tension that thrusts him ever to the Absolute, whatever we call it.”
These are just a few tidbits to whet the appetite for those provocative 500 
pages of experiential and speculative exploration, committed to the uncovery 
of the crosscultural wellsprings of the “religious.”
126
